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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellant New Union Wildlife Federation filed a complaint in
the United States District Court for the District of New Union
seeking review under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. On June 1, 2012, the
district court granted Jim Bob Bowman’s motion for summary
judgment on all counts and denied New Union Wildlife
Federation’s summary judgment motion. The district court’s
order is final, and jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. Whether New Union Wildlife Federation has standing to
represent the interests of its individual members in a suit against
Jim Bob Bowman for violating the Clean Water Act.
II. Whether Bowman remains in violation of the Clean Water
Act because of the continued existence of dredged and fill
material in the wetland, as required by section505(a) of the Clean
Water Act.
III. Whether New Union Department of Environmental
Protection’s administrative compliance order, which did not seek
injunctive relief or civil penalties, is diligent prosecution,
therefore barring New Union Wildlife Federation’s suit under
section 505(b) of the Clean Water Act.
IV. Whether Bowman violated sections 301(a) and 404 of the
Clean Water Act when he moved dredged and fill material from
one part of a wetland to another part of the same wetland.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final order of the District Court for
the District of New Union granting Jim Bob Bowman’s
(“Bowman”) motion for summary judgment and denying New
Union Wildlife Federation’s (“NUWF”) motion for summary
judgment. (R. 11). NUWF brought a civil action under the Clean
Water Act’s (“CWA”) citizen suit provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1365,
seeking civil penalties and injunctive relief requiring Bowman to
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restore the destroyed wetlands on his property. (R. 5). The New
Union Department of Environmental Protection (“NUDEP”)
intervened in the NUWF case because the state agency had its
own section 505 complaint pending against Bowman.
Id.
NUDEP filed its section 505 complaint on August 10, 2011. Id.
In NUDEP’s suit, the agency sought a decree enforcing the terms
of its compliance order issued under a New Union law identical to
section 309 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) and (g). (R. 4–5).
After discovery, Bowman filed a motion for summary
judgment. (R. 5). NUWF and NUDEP both filed cross-motions
for summary judgment. Id. The district court held that (1)
NUWF lacked standing to sue Bowman for violations of the CWA,
(2) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rule on NUWF’s
section 505 complaint because Bowman’s violations were wholly
past, (3) NUWF’s suit was barred because there was prior state
action, and (4) Bowman’s land-clearing activities did not violate
sections 301(a) and 404 of the CWA. (R. 11).
NUWF filed a Notice of Appeal challenging all four holdings
of the district court. (R. 1). NUDEP filed a Notice of Appeal
challenging the district court’s holdings that NUWF lacked
standing to bring its citizen suit and that Bowman did not violate
the CWA. Id.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On June 15, 2011, Jim Bob Bowman began land-clearing
operations on 1,000 acres of wetlands on his property adjacent to
the Muddy River in the state of New Union. (R. 3–4). These
land-clearing operations converted the entire parcel into land
suitable for agricultural purposes except for approximately 3.5
acres along the 650-foot shoreline of the Muddy River. Id. The
river is commonly used for recreational navigation for miles
upstream and downstream of Bowman’s property. Id.
The wetlands are hydrologically connected to the Muddy
River and are covered with trees and other vegetation that are
characteristic of wetlands. Id. The entire parcel is within the
100-year flood plain of the Muddy, and portions of Bowman’s
property are inundated every year when the river is high. Id. It
is undisputed that the property is a wetland as determined by the
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U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Wetlands Delineation Manual. (R.
3–4).
To clear the wetlands, Bowman used bulldozers to level all
the trees and other vegetation on the property, pushed the
vegetation into windrows, and burned the piles. (R. 4). Then,
Bowman dug trenches into which he pushed the ashes and
vegetation remains. Id. He leveled the now-cleared land,
pushing soil from high portions of the field into low-lying
portions. Id. Bowman excavated a ditch that ran from the back
of his property to the river to drain the field into the Muddy. Id.
He left a 150-foot strip along the bank of the Muddy River
untouched because it was too difficult to bulldoze while it was
saturated with water. Id. Eventually, when the field was
sufficiently drained, Bowman sowed it with winter wheat. (R. 5).
About two weeks after Bowman started clearing his land, on
July 1, NUWF sent a valid notice of intent to sue Bowman under
the citizen suit provision of the CWA. (R. 4). NUWF is a nonprofit corporation that aims to protect the fish and wildlife of New
Union by preserving their habitats. Id. It is a membership
organization funded by its members’ dues and led by a memberelected Board of Directors, who in turn selects the organization’s
officers. Id. Three of NUWF’s members, Dottie Milford, Zeke
Norton, and Effie Lawless, regularly use the Muddy River for
recreational purposes, including boating, fishing, picnicking, and
frogging. (R. 6). The members noticed that the Muddy looked
more polluted, and they stated that they felt a loss from the
destruction of the habitat as a result of Bowman’s activities. Id.
Shortly after NUWF sent notice of its suit, NUDEP sent
Bowman a notice of violation informing him that he had violated
both state and federal law. (R. 4). Bowman maintained that his
activities did not violate the CWA and continued to level and
drain the wetlands. Id. Upon completing land-clearing on July
15, 2011, Bowman entered into a settlement agreement with
NUDEP. Bowman agreed to convey a conservation easement to
NUDEP on the 150-foot strip of remaining wetland next to the
Muddy. Id. Bowman conveyed an additional 75-foot strip
between that conservation area and the new field, on which he
agreed to construct and maintain a buffer zone. Id. The
easement allows public entry for recreational purposes and
requires Bowman to keep the 225-foot buffer in its natural state.
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Id.
However, the agreement allows Bowman to put
approximately 996 acres of former wetlands to agricultural use.
(R. 4–5). Pursuant to a New Union state statute nearly identical
to section309(a) and (g) of the CWA, NUDEP issued an
administrative order incorporating the terms of this agreement.
(R. 4). Bowman signed the agreement on August 1, 2011. Id.
Although state law authorized NUDEP to include an
administrative penalty of up to $125,000, the state did not assess
a penalty. Id.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court granted Bowman’s motion for summary
judgment. This Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo. Lefevers v. GAF Fiberglass Corp., 667 F.3d 721,
723 (6th Cir. 2012).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court erred in holding that NUWF did not have
standing, that the dredged and fill material in Bowman’s wetland
was not a continuing violation as required by section 505(a) of the
CWA, that NUDEP’s prior state action barred NUWF’s citizen
suit, and that Bowman did not violate sections 301(a) and 404 of
the CWA. NUWF has organizational standing because its
individual members alleged sufficient facts to establish that they
suffered an injury from Bowman’s activities. Moreover, NUWF’s
suit does not lack subject matter jurisdiction under Gwaltney
because Bowman continues to be in violation of the CWA until he
removes the dredged and fill material from his wetlands.
NUDEP’s prior administrative action does not bar NUWF’s suit
because the agency did not diligently prosecute Bowman. Finally,
Bowman’s land-clearing activities violated the CWA because he
discharged dredged and fill material on his wetland without a
permit.
The district court erred in holding that NUWF lacked
standing. The court found that NUWF’s members did not allege
an actual or imminent injury that could be traced to Bowman’s
operation. To meet the standing requirement at this early stage
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of the litigation, only one of NUWF’s members has to establish a
“reasonable fear and concern” that Bowman’s activities harmed
their aesthetic or recreational interests. Three of NUWF’s
members satisfied this requirement because they testified that
Bowman’s activities harmed their use of the Muddy River and its
banks. NUWF has organizational standing to represent its
members.
NUWF has subject matter jurisdiction under Gwaltney
because the continued presence of dredged and fill material in
Bowman’s wetland constitutes a continuing violation of the CWA.
The weight of authority supports a finding that dredged and fill
material remaining in a wetland constitutes a continuing
violation. Such a finding is consistent with Gwaltney, which
emphasized that citizen suits are appropriate to abate an ongoing
violation of the CWA. Because the presence of dredged and fill
material itself violates section 404, Bowman was in violation at
the time the complaint was filed. The district court’s holding
would create a 60-day safe harbor for landowners to complete
their illegal land-clearing activities because the notice
requirement precludes citizens from filing suit within that
timeframe. This Court should allow NUWF’s citizen suit to
continue because a contrary holding is therefore inconsistent with
the weight of authority, the Supreme Court precedent in
Gwaltney, and the CWA’s goal to protect wetlands.
NUWF’s citizen suit is also not barred by NUDEP’s prior
administrative action.
The totality of the circumstances
surrounding NUDEP’s compliance order demonstrates that the
state agency’s action amounts to little more than a superficial
effort to preclude NUWF’s citizen suit. The administrative order
failed to bring Bowman into compliance with the CWA because it
does not seek civil penalties or require him to restore the
wetland.
Because NUDEP entered into a settlement with
Bowman so quickly, NUWF could not participate in the
compliance order process. And NUDEP’s suit does not stem from
a need to seek judicial enforcement of the compliance order. The
court therefore erred in concluding that NUDEP’s prior action
excluded NUWF’s citizen suit.
Bowman’s activities violated the CWA because he added
pollutants to wetlands when he redeposited dredged and fill
material without a permit. The plain language of the CWA

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/3

6

BRIEF-TEAM_50 BEST BRIEF FINAL

2013]

BEST BRIEF: OVERALL

55

indicates that “addition” includes redepositing dredged and fill
material. Furthermore, the EPA has prescribed a reasonable
regulatory interpretation that a redeposit can be an “addition”
under section 404. The EPA can define the term differently in
sections 402 and 404 because the statutory context supports
divergent implementation strategies. In particular, the EPA’s
decisions not to apply the water transfers rule or the outside
world definition of “addition” from section 402 in the 404 context
deserves deference.
Applying the EPA’s reasonable
interpretation of the term “addition” in section 404, Bowman
violated the CWA by redepositing dredged and fill material into
waters of the United States without a permit. Therefore, the
district court erred in holding that Bowman did not violate the
CWA.

ARGUMENT
I.

NUWF HAS ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING TO
REPRESENT ITS MEMBERS WHO WERE
INJURED BY BOWMAN’S LAND-CLEARING
ACTIVITIES.

The United States Constitution requires that there be a case
or controversy before a court can hear and decide a case. U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2. This requirement, known as standing, limits
judicial involvement to cases where individuals have a “direct
stake in the outcome.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739
(1972). Under the CWA, any “person or persons having an
interest which is or may be adversely affected” may commence a
civil action. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (g) (2006). A third party
organization can satisfy the standing requirement and represent
members who allege an injury when it meets three requirements:
“(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their
own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the
organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the
relief requested requires the participation of individual members
in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432
U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
Furthermore, NUWF is entitled to
represent its members in court because it has a formal
membership structure where its members fund the organization
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through dues and elect its leadership. See Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Chevron Chem. Co., 129 F.3d 826, 829 (5th Cir. 1997)
(holding that Friends of the Earth had members it could
represent because it had a clearly articulated membership
structure and was funded by individuals). Because NUWF
alleged facts sufficient to establish that its individual members
would have standing, the court below erred in barring NUWF’s
suit.
A. NUWF’s members could sue on their own behalf
because they satisfy the requirements to establish
constitutional and prudential standing.
Standing involves “constitutional limitations . . . and
prudential limitations.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 290, 298
(1975). NUWF’s members are entitled to sue on their own behalf
because individually, they alleged sufficient facts at this early
stage in the trial to meet both constitutional and prudential
standing requirements.
1. NUWF members have constitutional standing.
Three minimum requirements are needed to establish
constitutional standing. First, an individual must have an
“injury in fact” that is both “concrete and particularized” and
“actual or imminent.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560 (1992). Second, the injury must be “fairly traceable” to
the defendant’s action. Id. Finally, it must be likely that the
injury would be redressed by a judicial decision in the plaintiff’s
favor. Id. at 561. At the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff’s
evidence is “taken to be true.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
First, the injuries alleged by NUWF members Dottie Milford,
Zeke Norton, and Effie Lawless are sufficient to satisfy the
injury-in-fact prong of the standing test. The injury requirement
merely serves to certify that an individual has a direct stake in
the litigation, thus a plaintiff must only allege an “identifiable
trifle.” United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 734 n.14 (1973). In environmental
cases, aesthetic and recreational concerns are valid interests that
give rise to a statutorily protected injury, provided that the
organization can show that at least one of its members actually
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uses the area affected by the challenged activity and is therefore
personally harmed. Compare Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 183–84 (2000) (holding that the
plaintiff organization had standing because its members
regularly used a river for recreational purposes near a pollution
site but discontinued that use because the river looked and
smelled polluted); with Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S.
488, 494 (2009) (holding that Earth Island Institute lacked
standing to challenge several timber sales because affidavits did
not show that any members of the organization utilized the
specific areas affected by the sales). There is no dispute that
Milford, Norton, and Lawless all use the Muddy River and its
banks on or near Bowman’s property for recreational purposes
and that they personally feel a loss to the river’s ecosystem due to
Bowman’s activities. (R. 6). Milford stated that the Muddy itself
looks more polluted, and Norton stated that the loss of wetlands
has curtailed his frogging activity, which is legal on the portion of
Bowman’s property that has been put into a conservation
easement with the right of public entry. Id. Thus, at least one of
NUWF’s members alleges current injuries sufficient to satisfy the
first prong of standing.
NUDEP’s biologist suggested that NUWF does not allege an
injury-in-fact because the 3.6 acres of preserved wetlands will
eventually be a richer habitat than the original 1,000-acre
wetland tract. (R. 6). However, plaintiffs do not need scientific
proof of environmental harm to satisfy standing; a “reasonable
fear and concern” about the effects of the challenged activity on
their interests is sufficient to establish an injury-in-fact. Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149,
161 (4th Cir. 2000). Degradation of a river due to destruction of
an adjacent wetland is a recognized injury, making it reasonable
for NUWF’s members to conclude that destruction of the wetland
will have an adverse impact on the Muddy. Sierra Club v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 935 F. Supp. 1556, 1569 (D. Ala. 1996); see
also Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 777 (2006)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the “discharge of fill
material is [not] inconsequential for adjacent waterways”). In
Sierra Club, the court concluded that the plaintiff organization
had standing to challenge the destruction of a wetland because its
members alleged injuries stemming from recreational use of a
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river adjacent to the wetland even though any impact to the river
would “undoubtedly be slight.” Id. Similarly, Milford, Norton,
and Lawless reasonably fear that Bowman’s activities will
negatively affect their future use of the Muddy River, which is
sufficient to show an injury-in-fact.
Second, the injuries alleged by NUWF are “fairly traceable”
to Bowman’s activities. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. This causation
requirement is not equivalent to tort causation—plaintiffs do not
have to show to a scientific certainty that the defendant’s actions
caused the alleged injury. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Powell
Duffryn Terminals, 913 F.2d 64, 72 (3d Cir. 1990). It is
undisputed that degradation of the Muddy River in the vicinity of
Bowman’s property is caused by Bowman’s clearing activities.
Finally, it is likely that the injury alleged by NUWF would be
redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. To
satisfy the redressability requirement, a plaintiff must show a
likelihood that each separate form of relief would be likely to
remedy the alleged injury. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 185.
NUWF seeks injunctive relief and civil penalties, both of which
are necessary to “abate[] [illegal] conduct and prevent[] its
recurrence.”
Id. at 186.
Restoration of the wetlands on
Bowman’s property would halt the current losses to the
ecosystem in the area. Civil penalties both “promote immediate
compliance” and also “deter future violations” of the CWA when
the illegal conduct is ongoing. Id. at 184, 188. Because
Bowman’s wetlands remain filled and NUDEP failed to hold him
accountable for that illegal activity, NUWF has standing for both
injunctive relief and civil penalties to redress its current and
ongoing injuries. NUWF’s members satisfy the constitutional
standing requirement because they allege an injury-in-fact that is
fairly traceable to Bowman’s land-clearing activities, and this
Court can redress that injury.
2. NUWF has prudential standing because its injuries
are protected by sections 301 and 404 of the CWA.
Prudential standing requires NUWF to show that its injuries
“fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated” by the
CWA. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997). To fall within
this zone, the injury must “share a plausible relationship” with
the interests promoted by the statute. Ocean Advocates v. Corps
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of Eng’rs, 361 F.3d 1108, 1121 (9th Cir. 2004). The CWA’s section
404 permitting program limits the availability of permits to fill
wetlands when that activity would “have an unacceptable adverse
effect on . . . recreational areas.” 33 U.S.C. §1344(c) (2006).
Sedimentation and fear of continued degradation of the Muddy
River due to destruction of wetlands adjacent to the river is
directly related to the interests promoted by the CWA’s section
404 permitting program, thus satisfying prudential standing.
B. In bringing this suit, NUWF seeks to protect
interests that are germane to the organization’s
purpose of protecting the fish and wildlife of New
Union.
To establish standing, an organization must show that the
lawsuit “bears a reasonable connection to the association’s
knowledge and experience.” Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of
Buffalo v. Downtown Dev., Inc., 448 F.2d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2006).
The interests of NUWF’s members to continue using the Muddy
for recreational purposes, which include fishing and frogging, are
germane to the organization’s purpose of protecting wildlife and
its habitat. (R. 6).
C. This suit does not require participation by
individual members because NUWF seeks relief that
is not dependent on individualized proof.
An organization can represent its members in court if it
seeks relief that will “inure to the benefit of those members.”
Warth, 422 U.S. at 514. An organization lacks standing under
this prong only if it seeks monetary damages paid to its members,
which would require proof of the precise injury to that individual
to assess damages. Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. Allnet
Commc’n Servs., 806 F.2d 1093, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Here,
NUWF seeks injunctive relief and civil penalties paid to the U.S.
Treasury, neither of which requires the individuals to participate
in the suit. Therefore, NUWF has organizational standing to
represent its members in this suit because its members would
have standing in their own right, NUWF seeks to protect
interests germane to the organization’s purpose, and the suit does
not require participation by individual members.
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II.

GWALTNEY DOES NOT BAR NUWF’S CITIZEN
SUIT BECAUSE THE CONTINUED PRESENCE
OF DREDGED AND FILL MATERIAL IN
BOWMAN’S WETLANDS WAS AN ONGOING
VIOLATION OF THE CWA AT THE TIME OF
THE COMPLAINT.

In order to bring a citizen suit under section 505 of the CWA,
NUWF must allege that Bowman is “in violation of” the Act. 33
U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2006). A citizen must “allege a state of either
continuous or intermittent violation” to meet this requirement.
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484
U.S. 49, 57 (1987). Gwaltney made clear that this requirement is
meant to prevent citizens from seeking civil penalties for “wholly
past violations.” Id. at 58. The majority of courts addressing the
issue have held that dredged or fill material that remains in a
wetland without a permit is a continuing violation until the
material is removed. City of Mountain Park, Ga., v. Lakeside at
Ansley, L.L.C., 560 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1296 (N.D. Ga. 2008)
(collecting cases). NUWF alleges that dredged and fill material
remains in Bowman’s wetlands without a permit and therefore
Bowman is in violation of the CWA. Thus, the district court erred
in finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over NUWF’s
claim.
A. Bowman is in violation of the CWA because dredged
and fill material remains in the wetland.
In order to establish subject matter jurisdiction, NUWF need
only to have alleged in good faith that Bowman was in violation of
the CWA. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64–65. The time at which the
complaint is filed is the relevant time for determining whether a
violation is ongoing. Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of Buffalo,
N.Y. & Vicinity v. Downtown Dev., Inc., 448 F.3d 138, 151 (2d Cir.
2006). Where the plaintiff has alleged a good faith violation of
the CWA, the Gwaltney test is met and jurisdiction vests.
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64–65. If the defendant contests that he is
not in violation of the CWA, he must seek dismissal not for lack of
jurisdiction but for mootness. Id. at 66. “In seeking to have a
case dismissed as moot, however, the defendant’s burden ‘is a
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heavy one.’” Id. (quoting United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345
U.S. 629, 633 (1953)). In contrast to this heavy burden, NUWF’s
jurisdictional bar is a low one. City of Mountain Park, 560 F.
Supp. at 1297. The district courts’ interpretation of Gwaltney
provides a good faith legal basis for NUWF’s claim because the
majority rule is that dredged and fill material that remains in a
wetland constitutes a continuing violation of the CWA.
1. The weight of authority supports finding that
dredged and fill material that remains in a wetland
constitutes a continuing violation.
A pollutant, including dredged or fill material, that remains
in a wetland is a continuing violation until removed. Sasser v.
EPA, 990 F.2d 127, 129 (4th Cir. 1993) (“Each day the pollutant
remains in the wetlands without a permit constitutes an
additional day of violation.”). The Second Circuit has noted that
“[m]ost courts that have addressed the question have concluded
on the facts before them that the continuing presence of a
pollutant constitutes a continuing [violation] under the CWA.”1
June v. Town of Westfield, N.Y., 370 F.3d 255, 258 n.4 (2d Cir.
2004) (citation omitted).
The important differences between sections 402 and 404 have
shaped the majority rule governing continuing violations under
section 404. According to one court, the “primary factor” that
persuaded it to follow the majority rule was the nature of dredged
and fill material. City of Mountain Park, 560 F. Supp. 2d at 1296.
Unlike discharges under section 402, which “dissipate or
dissolve,” “fill materials, when discharged, . . . stay intact over
time and thus continue to have roughly the same net polluting
effect years or even decades after the time of their deposit.” Id.
Not only is the net polluting effect the same over time, but so too
is the opportunity to remedy the violation. Bowman was in
1. The majority rule is that dredged or fill material that remains in
wetlands is a continuing violation of the CWA. See City of Mountain Park, 560
F. Supp. 2d at 1296; Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Goss, 1:00 CV 0219, 2005 WL
1563433, at *3 (N.D. Ind. June 28, 2005); Hamelin, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 248;
Informed Citizens United, Inc. v. USX Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 375, 377-78 (S.D.
Tex. 1999); United States v. Reaves, 923 F. Supp. 1530, 1534 (M.D. Fla. 1996);
N.C. Wildlife Fed’n v. Woodbury, 87-584-CIV-5, 1989 WL 106517, at *2
(E.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 1989).
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violation of the CWA at the time of the complaint because
dredged and fill material remained in the wetlands. This is
sufficient to meet the Gwaltney test for subject matter
jurisdiction.
2. Finding that the continued presence of dredged
and fill material qualifies as a continuing violation
of the CWA is consistent with Gwaltney.
Gwaltney’s focus on the important role section 505 citizen
suits play in abating environmental harms supports finding that
dredged and fill materials that remain in a wetland constitute a
continuing violation. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 61. As Justice Scalia
noted in his concurring opinion, “The phrase in § 505(a), ‘to be in
violation,’ unlike the phrase ‘to be violating’ or ‘to have committed
a violation,’ suggests a state rather than an act—the opposite of a
state of compliance.” Id. at 69 (Scalia, J., concurring). Citizen
suits play an important role in forcing violators into a state of
compliance. The Court considered the legislative history behind
the citizen suit provision and specifically noted that “[m]embers
of Congress frequently characterized the citizen suit provisions as
‘abatement’ provisions or as injunctive measures.” Id. at 61
(majority opinion).
There is an important distinction between what constitutes
abatement under sections 402 and 404. Within the context of
section 402, Gwaltney requires that there either be ongoing
discharges in violation of the permit or a reasonable likelihood of
future discharges. Id. at 57. This makes logical sense if the
purpose of section 505 is abatement. If the violator has stopped
discharging pollutants then there is nothing to abate and the
pollutants will “dissipate or dissolve over time.” City of Mountain
Park, 560 F. Supp. at 1296. Within the context of section 404
violations, however, the unpermitted filling of a wetland is a
remediable situation until the fill is removed. See, e.g., United
States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 805 (8th Cir. 2009) (upholding
injunctive relief requiring a landowner who filled wetlands
without a section 404 permit to restore the wetlands). This is the
exact remedy that NUWF seeks—an injunction requiring that
Bowman remove the fill. Thus the Court’s reasoning in Gwaltney
that the citizen suit provision is meant to encourage “abatement
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provisions” or “injunctive measures” supports the finding of a
continuing violation under the facts of this case.
The notice requirement of section 505 citizen suits also gives
violators an opportunity to come into compliance with the CWA
and to avoid having to go to court. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (2006). “It
follows logically that the purpose of notice to the alleged violator
is to give it an opportunity to bring itself into complete
compliance with the Act and thus likewise render unnecessary a
citizen suit.” Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60. In the section 404
context, complete compliance means obtaining a permit or
removing the illegally deposited dredged and fill material. See
Bailey, 571 F.3d at 803 (considering an after-the-fact permit or a
restoration order as the appropriate remedies for a section 404
violation). As Bowman has done neither, NUWF’s citizen suit
remains necessary for enforcement of the CWA.
Bowman argues that the majority rule would obviate the
continuing violation requirement in the section 404 context. This
argument seeks support from the jurisdictions that have held
that subsequent harmful effects of a violation of the CWA do not
constitute a continuing violation.
See, e.g., Conn. Coastal
Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 989 F.2d 1305,
1313 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the continuing disintegration of
lead shot from a firing range that remained in Long Island Sound
was not a continuing violation under Gwaltney). However, the
court in City of Mountain Park explicitly rejected applying this
approach to section 404 violations because the presence of
dredged and fill material itself constitutes a violation of the CWA.
City of Mountain Park, 560 F. Supp. 2d at 1296.
Another key difference between Remington Arms and the
present case is that the plaintiffs in Remington Arms did not seek
injunctive relief but only civil penalties. 989 F.2d at 1312. This
alone is sufficient to distinguish it from the present case.
Injunctive relief is by its very nature forward looking. Where an
injunction seeks to abate a violation of the CWA, Gwaltney
indicates that the continuing violation requirement is met.
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60. Civil penalties, in contrast, must be
aimed at past action because one cannot penalize future behavior.
Because NUWF seeks an injunction to remedy an ongoing
violation, Remington Arms is inapplicable.
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The ongoing presence of dredged or fill material is not a
continuing violation if the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)
or the EPA fully enforces the Act through off-site remediation or
an after-the-fact permit. Orange Env’t, Inc. v. Cnty. of Orange,
923 F. Supp. 529, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); 33 C.F.R. § 326.3(e) (2012)
(instructing the Corps to issue after-the-fact permits). The court
in Orange Environment dismissed the plaintiffs’ citizen suit
because the EPA and the defendant had remedied the situation
through “off-site remediation creating at least twice the amount
of federal wetlands that had been filled.” Id. at 349–50. The
court was clear that the off-site remediation brought the
defendant into a state of compliance with the CWA. Id. at 538–
39. Thus, following the majority rule that the continued presence
of dredged or fill material in a wetland constitutes a continuing
violation does not obviate the Gwaltney requirement.
Bowman also suggests that holding him in state of
continuing violation would preclude application of the statute of
limitations. This is contrary to established law. Courts have held
that the five year statute of limitations on government actions,
contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462, also applies to CWA citizen suits.
E.g., Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn
Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 74 (3d Cir. 1990). The statute of
limitations begins to run when “reports documenting the
violations have been filed with the EPA.” Woodbury, 1989 WL
106517, at *4. Furthermore, this statute of limitations only
applies to “‘enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture,
pecuniary or otherwise’” and not to actions for injunctive relief.
E.g., United States v. Telluride Co., 146 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th
Cir. 1998) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2006)). Instead, “the
doctrine of laches controls the availability of equitable relief.”
Woodbury, 1989 WL 106517, at *4. This doctrine depends on the
plaintiff’s diligence and not the time at which the defendant
violated the CWA. Id. Thus, applying the majority rule
governing application of the continuing violation requirement
would not alter the statute of limitations for section 505 citizen
suits.
NUWF’s section 505 complaint seeks an injunction requiring
Bowman to remove the fill material and restore the wetlands. (R.
5). The continued presence of the dredged and fill material in the
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wetlands without a permit provides a good faith basis for
NUWF’s allegation that he is in violation of the act.
B. Public policy weighs strongly in favor of finding
that dredged and fill material is a continuing
violation so long as it remains in wetlands.
The goal of the CWA is to “restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). This includes protecting
wetlands from unregulated filling. As the oft quoted district
court opinion Woodbury explained, excluding activities like
Bowman’s would run contrary to the stated goals of the CWA:
If citizen-suits were barred merely because any illegal ditching
and drainage of a wetland tract was completed before it might
reasonably be discovered, violators would have a powerful
incentive to conceal their activities from public and private
scrutiny—which would lead to serious problems in public and
private enforcement of the Clean Water Act.

Woodbury, 1989 WL 106517 at *3. This is exactly the result that
the district court’s decision creates if allowed to stand. NUWF
sent Bowman a notice of intent to sue under the CWA only fifteen
days after he began his land-clearing activities. (R. 4). Rather
than stop filling the wetlands, he completed his operation in only
fourteen days—before NUWF was legally permitted to file its
complaint. Id.; 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A). The district court’s
decision would reward this activity by holding him immune from
a CWA citizen suit. This would undermine the clearly stated goal
of protecting federal wetlands. As the EPA explains in its
regulations, “[T]he degradation or destruction of special aquatic
sites, such as filling operations in wetlands, is considered to be
among the most severe environmental impacts covered by these
Guidelines. The guiding principle should be that degradation or
destruction of special sites may represent an irreversible loss of
valuable aquatic resources.” 40 C.F.R. § 230.1 (2012) (emphasis
added). Allowing wetlands to remain filled simply because the
land owner was able to fill them under cover of night undermines
the purpose of the CWA and thus is not a reasonable
interpretation of the requirements established in Gwaltney.
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NUWF has made a good faith allegation that because of the
continued presence of dredged and fill material in Bowman’s
wetlands he remains in violation of the CWA. This is all that
Gwaltney requires for subject matter jurisdiction. Furthermore,
the weight of authority supports NUWF’s argument that Bowman
is in violation of the CWA until the fill material is removed. To
hold otherwise is contrary to the stated policy of the CWA and to
the public interest in protecting our nation’s wetlands. For these
reasons this Court should reverse the decision of the district court
regarding subject matter jurisdiction.
III.

NUWF’S CITIZEN SUIT IS NOT BARRED BY
NUDEP’S PRIOR ACTION BECAUSE THE SUIT
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE DILIGENT
PROSECUTION.

The CWA does not bar NUWF’s citizen suit because
NUDEP’s administrative compliance order both substantively
and procedurally fails to diligently prosecute Bowman. Section
505 of the CWA authorizes “any citizen” to seek enforcement of
CWA violations. 33 U.S.C. §1365(a) (2006). However, the CWA
bars citizen suits if the “State has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court . . . to require
compliance with the standard, limitation, or order.” Id. §
1365(b)(1)(B).
An enforcement action under the CWA is diligent if it “is
capable of requiring compliance with the Act and is in good faith
calculated to do so.” Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. Cnty. Comm’rs of
Carroll Cnty., Md., 523 F.3d 453, 459 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotations omitted). While agency diligence is presumed, the
preference for governmental enforcement is counterbalanced by
robust opportunities for public participation in enforcing the
CWA. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc.,
890 F. Supp. 470, 487 (D.S.C. 1995). When determining whether
an agency’s administrative action qualifies as diligent prosecution
of a CWA violation, courts examine both “the process and effects
of agency prosecution.” SPIRG v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc.,
579 F. Supp. 1528, 1535 (D.N.J. 1984) (emphasis added). The
“totality of the circumstances” determines if there has been
diligent prosecution. Friends of the Earth, 890 F. Supp. at 490.
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NUDEP’s action does not preclude NUWF’s citizen suit
because it fails to bring Bowman into compliance with the CWA.
Moreover, NUDEP’s suit does not stem from a need to seek
judicial enforcement of the compliance order but merely serves as
a superficial effort to exclude NUWF’s suit. The court below
therefore erred in concluding that NUDEP’s action precluded
NUWF’s citizen suit.
A. NUDEP’s compliance order is substantively
deficient because it does not require Bowman to
come into compliance with the CWA, and it does not
assess a civil penalty.
NUWF’s suit is not barred because NUDEP’s compliance
order does not address Bowman’s continuing violation of the
CWA. See Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 933 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that citizen suits
are barred only when a state enforcement proceeding “has caused
the violations alleged in the citizen suit to cease”). When the
administrative order “does not settle all the issues in th[e] case,”
it does not preclude a citizen suit. Atl. States Legal Found., Inc.
v. Hamelin, 182 F. Supp. 2d 235, 244 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). In
Hamelin, the court allowed a citizen suit to continue because the
administrative compliance order “only preclud[ed] Defendant
from engaging in additional filling of wetlands” and did not
address the continued existence of fill. Id. at 243–44. Similarly,
NUDEP’s consent order only requires Bowman to immediately
cease additional land-clearing and does not address the fill
remaining in the wetlands. (R. 4). The settlement also does not
require Bowman to seek an after-the-fact permit for filling his
wetlands, meaning he remains in violation of the CWA. Id.; See
33 C.F.R. § 326.3(e) (2012) (instructing the Corps to issue an
after-the-fact permit to remedy a section 404 violation). Thus,
NUDEP’s administrative order and subsequent suit did not
“require compliance” with section 404 and therefore is not
diligent prosecution of the CWA violation.
33 U.S.C. §
1365(b)(1)(B).
Moreover, NUDEP’s compliance order does not constitute
diligent prosecution because it did not impose any administrative
penalties on Bowman. Friends of the Earth, 890 F. Supp. at 491.
The CWA’s civil penalty provisions aim to protect the nation’s
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waters by deterring future violations. Id. Recognizing the
importance of deterrence in the CWA’s statutory scheme, the
Ninth Circuit has held that for a compliance order to constitute
diligent prosecution, “a penalty must actually have been
assessed.” Knee Deep Cattle Co., Inc. v. Bindana Investors Co.
Ltd., 94 F.3d 514, 516 (9th Cir. 1996). At the very least, the
amount of a penalty imposed in an administrative enforcement
action must be calculated to “recover an amount beyond the
economic benefit of noncompliance.” Friends of the Earth, 890 F.
Supp. at 492.
Under New Union’s law, the NUDEP could have sought an
administrative penalty of up to $125,000, yet the compliance
order did not include any monetary penalties. (R. 4). Bowman
also benefitted from his noncompliance. He gained nearly 1,000
acres of agriculturally productive land that was previously nonproductive in exchange for putting a 3.5 acre strip of land under a
conservation easement. (R. 4–5). The compliance order not only
failed to address Bowman’s ongoing CWA violations, but also
failed to deter future violations through a civil penalty.
B. NUDEP did not diligently prosecute Bowman
because the agency did not follow the CWA’s
procedural requirements for administrative orders.
NUDEP’s section 505 suit does not constitute diligent
prosecution because it was an insincere attempt to exclude citizen
involvement in the enforcement process. In enacting the CWA,
Congress included meaningful opportunities for private citizen
involvement in the enforcement process to “insur[e] expeditious
implementation of the authority and a high level of performance
by all levels of government.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 72 (1971),
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3738.
Due to the
importance placed on citizen involvement in CWA enforcement,
lack of opportunity for citizens to participate in that enforcement
indicates nondiligent prosecution. See Love v. N.Y. State Dept. of
Envtl. Conservation, 529 F. Supp. 832, 843–44 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(holding that a state did not diligently prosecute a violation
because there was no opportunity for the citizens to intervene in
the administrative action).
Here, NUDEP deviated from the typical approach taken in
administrative actions, with the effect of excluding citizen
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involvement in the enforcement process. First, it is questionable
whether NUDEP’s section 505 suit is even proper. The statute
requires that a citizen be “adversely affected” in order to bring a
suit. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (2006). However, because NUDEP
argues that the compliance order addresses Bowman’s CWA
violation, the state can no longer claim to have an interest that is
adversely affected. Second, there was no reason for NUDEP to
bring a suit against Bowman because he was in full compliance
with the compliance order. (R. 4). Regulations guiding the
CWA’s implementation state that when a violator takes initial
corrective measures following guidance from the agency, then
“further enforcement action should normally be unnecessary.” 33
C.F.R. § 326.3(d) (2012). Because NUDEP had no dispute with
Bowman, the agency’s section 505 suit can only be motivated by a
desire to trigger section 505’s preclusion on citizen suits. The
substance of NUDEP’s action against Bowman does not rise to
the level of diligent prosecution contemplated by section 505 and
instead amounts to little more than an administrative activity
governed by section 309.
If a state chooses to pursue administrative enforcement
under section 309 of the CWA, “then § 1365(b)(1)(B) [does] not
apply.” Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. and Energy Workers Int’l
Union v. Continental Carbon Co., 428 F.3d 1285, 1298 (10th Cir.
2005). Instead, section 309’s narrower preclusion on citizen suits
governs. Id. Section 309 does not preclude citizen suits when a
citizen gives notice of intent to sue before the state agency starts
an administrative action as long as the suit is filed within 120
days after that notice. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g)(6)(B)(ii) (2006).
NUWF filed its notice of intent to sue Bowman on July 1, 2011,
before NUDEP commenced its administrative action. (R. 4).
NUWF filed its section 505 complaint on August 30, 2011, well
within the 120-day time limit. (R. 5). The plain language of
section 309 therefore would not bar NUWF’s suit. See, e.g., Black
Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Cherokee Mining, L.L.C., 548 F.3d
986, 992 (11th Cir. 2008) (allowing a citizen suit to continue
under section 309(g)(6)(B)(ii) when the notice of intent to sue was
filed prior to commencement of an administrative enforcement
action and the citizen suit was filed within the 120-day time
limit).
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The fact that section 309 allows for citizen suits to continue
alongside administrative actions further supports allowing
NUWF’s suit to continue. Section 309 requires public notice and
opportunity to comment on any proposed order assessing civil
administrative penalties. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4)(A). Anyone who
comments on a proposed administrative penalty “shall have a
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.” Id.
§ 1319(g)(4)(B).
Once someone comments on a proposed
administrative penalty, that individual may then “obtain judicial
review” of that penalty. Id. § 1319(g)(8). These provisions ensure
that “citizen groups are not to be treated as nuisances or
troublemakers but rather as welcomed participants in the
vindication of environmental interests.” Friends of the Earth v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985) (internal
quotations omitted).
Barring NUWF’s suit would be inconsistent with the CWA’s
emphasis on citizen participation in the statute’s enforcement.
Under section 309, NUWF should have had the opportunity to
participate in the administrative compliance procedures. 33
U.S.C. § 1319(g)(8). Yet, NUDEP quickly entered into settlement
talks with Bowman after NUWF sent its notice of intent to sue,
and the agency issued its compliance order a mere fifteen days
after Bowman finished clearing his wetlands. (R. 4). Despite
knowing that NUWF had an interest in the proceeding, NUDEP
did not give NUWF notice that the agency was negotiating with
Bowman—a requirement of the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4)(A).
Just ten days after issuing the administrative order, NUDEP
brought suit in federal court, closing off any opportunity for
NUWF to participate in the enforcement process outside of court.
See Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping
Co., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1404, 1416 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (holding that
where an agency was motivated by the specter of a citizen suit
and the administrative compliance process advanced much faster
than usual, the prosecution was not diligent).
Based on the “totality of the circumstances,” NUDEP’s
disingenuous prosecution, the hurried settlement agreement
between Bowman and the agency, and the lack of public
involvement in the administrative enforcement process all
demonstrate that NUDEP’s efforts are not diligent. Friends of
the Earth, 890 F. Supp. at 490. Allowing NUDEP’s insincere
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prosecution to bar NUWF’s citizen suit “would render citizen
suits impossible when they are required most: instances where an
agency encourages a polluter to believe its unlawful behavior will
go unpunished.” EPA v. City of Green Forest, Ark., 921 F.2d 1394,
1405 (8th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted). Therefore,
this Court should not bar NUWF’s citizen suit on the basis of
NUDEP’s prior administrative action.
IV.

BOWMAN’S ACTIVITIES VIOLATED THE CWA
BECAUSE HE ADDED POLLUTANTS TO
WETLANDS WHEN HE REDPOSITED
DREDGED AND FILL MATERIAL ON HIS
PROPERTY WITHOUT A PERMIT.

The CWA prohibits the “addition” of any “pollutant” to
“navigable waters” from a “point source” without a permit. 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a)(1) (2006). Addition is the only element
contested in this appeal. The issue presented is whether the term
“addition,” as used to define discharge under section 404, can
include material that is scooped up and then redeposited in the
same wetland without introducing additional pollutants. The
EPA has interpreted “addition” as including this type of redeposit
under section 404. 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2012). This interpretation
is consistent with the plain language of the CWA and is a
reasonable construction of the term in light of the context in
which it is employed.
Under section 402, however, the EPA has interpreted
“addition” narrowly, exempting water transfers from permitting
when they do not introduce additional pollutants. 40 C.F.R. §
122.3(i) (2012).
Section 402 governs the discharge of all
pollutants except those covered by section 404; namely,
discharges of dredged and fill material. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(1),
1344(a). Because sections 402 and 404 govern distinct statutory
pollutants, the presumption favoring symmetrical construction of
common statutory terms gives way. Thus, the EPA’s distinct
interpretations of the word “addition” are appropriate and should
be upheld as within its customary discretion to resolve questions
of statutory interpretation.
A. The “addition” of dredged and fill material includes
redepositing such material in wetlands according to
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the plain language of the CWA and the EPA’s
reasonable regulatory interpretation.
When resolving questions of statutory interpretation, courts
first examine the underlying statute to see “whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984). “The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is
determined by reference to the language itself, the specific
context in which that language is used, and the broader context of
the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,
341 (1997). If these “traditional tools of statutory construction”
indicate that “Congress had an intention on the precise question
at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.”
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. When the “statute alone does not
resolve the case,” the court will turn to the agency regulations,
“which are entitled to deference if they resolve the ambiguity in a
reasonable manner.”
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska
Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 277–78 (2009) (citations
omitted).
Turning first to the statute, the CWA prohibits the
“discharge of any pollutant” without a permit. 33 U.S.C. §§
1311(a), 1342(a)(1). The CWA defines “discharge of a pollutant”
as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any
point source.” Id. § 1362(12). “Pollutant” is further defined to
include a variety of materials, including “dredged spoil . .
.biological waste, rock, [and] sand.” Id. § 1362(6). Section 404 of
the CWA explicitly regulates the discharge of “dredged or fill
material” and commits that authority to the Corps. Id. §
1342(a)(1). The CWA does not define “addition,” the term at issue
here.
“Addition” has a plain meaning when considered in the
context of section 404. Because “dredged material is by definition
material that comes from the water itself,” the addition of
dredged material reasonably includes redeposits in the water
from which it was taken. Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v.
Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 924 n.43 (5th Cir. 1983). As the Fourth
Circuit explained, “Surely Congress would not have used the
word ‘addition’ . . . to prohibit the discharge of dredged spoil in a
wetland, while intending to prohibit such pollution only when the
dredged material comes from outside the wetland.” United States
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v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 336 (4th Cir. 2000). A reading of
“addition” that does not include redeposits is “foreclosed because .
. . [it] would read [dredged spoil] out of the Act.” United States v.
Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 213 (6th Cir. 2009). Therefore, “the
[CWA’s] definition of discharge and its use of the term addition
unambiguous[ly]” include redeposits of dredged and fill material.2
Deaton, 209 F.3d at 336.
Even if the statutory language is ambiguous concerning
redeposits, the EPA regulations “resolve the ambiguity in a
reasonable manner” and are thus “are entitled to deference.”
Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 277 (citations omitted). The EPA
prescribed regulations that define the “discharge of dredged
material” as “any addition of dredged material into, including
redeposit of dredged material other than incidental fallback
within, the waters of the United States.” 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2012)
(emphasis added). The EPA’s regulations explain the CWA’s use
of “addition” as it relates to discharges of dredged spoil by
including redeposits within section 404. As the Sixth Circuit
explained, this is a “reasonable agency interpretation and must
be accorded deference.” Cundiff, 555 F.3d at 214.
A contrary interpretation would eviscerate the wetland
protections Congress intended to create. The Senate Report
accompanying the CWA explicitly referred to the importance of
wetlands and section 404’s role in protecting them:
There is no question that the systematic destruction of the
nation’s wetlands is causing serious, permanent ecological
damage. The wetlands and bays, estuaries and deltas are the
nation’s most biologically active areas.
They represent a
principal source of food supply. They are the spawning grounds
for much of the fish and shell fish which populate the oceans, and

2. The circuit courts have consistently held that “addition” of pollutants can
include redeposits under section 404. See United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d
200, 213–14 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Hubenka, 438 F.3d 1026, 1035
(10th Cir. 2006); Green Acres Enter., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.3d 852, 856–57
(8th Cir. 2005); Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Macklin, 361 F.3d 934, 948–49 (7th Cir.
2004); Borden Ranch P’ship v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F.3d 810, 814 (9th Cir.
2001); United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 335–36 (4th Cir. 2000); Nat’l Min.
Ass’n v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United
States v. MCC of Fla., Inc., 772 F.2d 1501, 1505–06 (11th Cir. 1985); Avoyelles
Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 923 (5th Cir. 1983).
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they are passages for numerous upland game fish. They also
provide nesting areas for a myriad of species of birds and wildlife.

S. Rep. No. 95-370 at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4326, 4336. “The unregulated destruction of these areas,” the
Report continued, “is a matter which needs to be corrected and
which implementation of section 404 has attempted to achieve.”
Id.
The EPA regulations champion the protections created in
section 404 by regulating land-clearing operations like Bowman’s
that redeposit pollutants into wetlands. To the extent that
“addition” is ambiguous under the CWA, the EPA’s interpretation
of the term in the context of section 404 resolves the ambiguity in
a reasonable manner and is entitled to Chevron deference.
B. Bowman’s interpretation of “addition” improperly
applies section 402 regulatory interpretations to the
discharge of dredged and fill material under section
404.
The CWA divides permitting authority between the EPA and
the Corps under sections 402 and 404 respectively. Under section
402, the EPA has interpreted the “addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters” narrowly, in contrast with its broad
interpretation under section 404. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.3(i), 242.2
(2012). The EPA has used two interrelated concepts in defining
addition under section 402, the outside world concept and the
unitary waters theory. Neither of these apply in the context of
section 404.
1. The EPA can interpret “addition” differently under
sections 402 and 404.
The statutory context in which “addition” is used supports
multiple interpretations of that term. In 2008, the EPA codified
its position that a water transfer that “conveys or connects waters
of the United States” is exempt from section 402 permitting. 40
C.F.R. § 122.3(i). This rule stems from the unitary waters theory,
which “holds that it is not an ‘addition . . . to navigable waters’ to
move existing pollutants from one navigable water to another.”
Friends of Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d
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1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009). Under this theory, addition of
pollutants only occurs “when pollutants first enter navigable
waters, . . . not when they are moved between navigable waters.”
Id. This interpretation of “addition” does not apply under section
404 discharges.
As the Supreme Court has held, “[T]he natural presumption
that identical words used in different parts of the same act are
intended to have the same meaning is not rigid and readily yields
whenever” the context of the statute “reasonably” suggests that
the same words “were employed in different parts of the act with
different intent.” Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561,
574 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). This flexible
approach preserves the “customary agency discretion to resolve
questions about statutory definition” with a “reasonable”
construction. Id. at 576.
Applying these rules of interpretation, Duke Energy upheld
the EPA’s decision to apply two distinct regulatory
interpretations to the term “modification,” as used in the Clean
Air Act, defining it in terms of hourly rate in one context and
annual discharge in another. Id. at 569. The Court upheld the
different interpretations of “modification”—despite its “common
statutory definition”—because the term was associated with
“distinct statutory objects calling for different implementation
strategies.” Id.
Here, the EPA has also applied two distinct regulatory
interpretations to the term “addition.” Under section 402,
redeposited water is not a discharge of pollutants as long as the
source does not add additional pollutants to the water. 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.3(i). Under section 404, a redeposit can be an addition of
pollutants as long as it is not “incidental fallback.” Id. § 242.2.
The presumption favoring symmetrical construction gives way
here, as it did in Duke Energy, because sections 402 and 404
present distinct contexts that support the reasonableness of the
EPA’s divergent approaches.
Several factors support this
conclusion.
First, the CWA bifurcates the regulatory authority between
two agencies—the EPA issues permits under section 402, while
the Corps issues permits under section 404. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a),
1344(a) (2006). Second, section 404 has a distinct role within the
CWA. As the Senate Report accompanying the CWA explained,
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the “primary thrust” of section 404 is to protect “wetlands” from
“unregulated destruction.” S. Rep. No. 95-370 at 10. Third,
section 404 has exclusive jurisdiction over the discharge of
dredged material—unique among the CWA pollutants because it
is material that must be removed from waters of the United
States before it can be discharged. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a), 1344(a).
Finally, while the unitary waters theory preserves EPA
jurisdiction under section 402, it would largely eliminate the
Corps’s section 404 jurisdiction over the discharge of dredged
material. Under the theory, the EPA can enforce section 402
performance standards when pollutants first enter waters of the
United States. Friends of Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1217. On the
other hand, applying this theory to dredged material would
preclude the Corps from enforcing section 404 unless the material
was imported from foreign waters. For all practical purposes,
excavating, sidecasting, and draining activities would fall outside
section 404 jurisdiction, allowing land owners like Bowman to
evade the CWA.
Taken together, these factors demonstrate that dredged
material under section 404 is a “distinct statutory object[]” that
warrants a “different implementation strateg[y].” Duke Energy,
549 U.S. at 574. The common statutory definition does not
require this Court to “ignore the reasons for regulating” sections
402 and 404 “differently,” and the EPA’s construction of the
statutory definition “falls within the limits of what is reasonable.”
Id. at 576. Thus this Court should uphold the EPA’s divergent
interpretations of addition.
2. The water transfers rule under section 402 did not
amend section 404 dredge-and-fill regulations by
implication.
Section 404 was not amended by implication because the
EPA explicitly rejected such a construction and the two
regulatory schemes are not in irreconcilable conflict. “The rules
of statutory construction apply when interpreting an agency
regulation.” Roberto v. Dep’t of Navy, 440 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). One cannon of construction is that
implied amendments “are not favored and will not be presumed”
absent “clear and manifest [intent].” Nat’l Ass’n of Home
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 663–64 n.8 (2007).
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A new regulation will not be read to amend “a prior one unless
there exists a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the
new and those of the old that cannot be reconciled.” Blanchette v.
Conn. Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102, 134 (1974) (internal
quotations omitted). In sum, an implied amendment is only
appropriate when consistent with the agency’s clear intent or
when an irreconcilable conflict exists between the new and old
regulations.
The water transfers rule is void of any reference to section
404. 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(i) (2012). Thus any contention that this
rule somehow altered the section 404 implementing regulations
contradicts the plain language of the rule. Even if the rule were
ambiguous, an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations “is
entitled to a measure of deference” so long as it is not “plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations.” Coeur Alaska,
557 U.S. at 284–85 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the
EPA has issued an interpretation of the water transfers rule that
expressly rejects the amendment by implication argument.
When issuing the final rule, the EPA highlighted that it
“focuses exclusively on water transfers” and “has no effect on the
404 permit program.” National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) Water Transfers Rule 73 Fed. Reg. 33,697,
33,697, 33,703 (June 13, 2008) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122).
This position is consistent with its response to draft rule
comments, which instructed that the unitary waters
“interpretation does not effect EPA’s longstanding regulation” of
“the deposit or redeposit of dredged or fill material” under section
404. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
Water Transfers Proposed Rule 71 Fed. Reg. 32,887, 32,892
(proposed June 7, 2006) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122). This
interpretation merits deference because it provides a “reasonable
and coherent” explanation as to why the water transfers rule did
not amend the longstanding regulation of redeposited dredge and
fill material. Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 283–84, 288.
Furthermore, no “positive repugnancy” exists between the
two regulatory schemes as the two sections operate apart from
one another—section 402 standards do not apply to section 404
permitting decisions. Id. at 283–84. Given that amendments by
implication are disfavored and the two regulations are not in
irreconcilable conflict, the Court should defer to the EPA’s
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interpretation of the water transfers rule as not amending section
404 permitting.
3. The outside world definition of addition does not
apply to section 404 because the EPA has explicitly
rejected such a construction.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, in cases involving
discharges from dams, the EPA took the position that a pollutant
is not added under section 402 “unless a source ‘physically
introduces a pollutant into water from the outside world.’” Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 584 (6th
Cir. 1988) (quoting Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156,
175 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Those courts deferred to the EPA’s
definition, holding that although dam operations change “water
quality,” they are not subject to section 402 according to the
outside world interpretation. Id. 586–87.
In the decades since, the EPA has never argued that this
narrow interpretation of addition is relevant in section 404
permitting. When issuing the 1993 amendment to its definition
for discharges of dredged material, the EPA stressed that its
outside world interpretation from Gorsuch and Consumers Power
is inapplicable under section 404. Clean Water Act Regulatory
Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008, 45,011 (Aug. 25, 1993). “Since
dredged material comes from the water itself,” limiting
jurisdiction to material that comes from “outside” the waters
“‘would effectively remove the dredge-and-fill provision from the
statute.’” Id. (quoting Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 924 n.43). The EPA
also rejected a test that would turn on “whether dredged material
is moved from ‘one place to another’ or ‘from one water to
another.’” Id. “Such a vague test” would likely lead to “arbitrary
distinctions among activities that may be identical in terms of the
amount of soil redeposited and their effects on the aquatic
system, but differ only in terms of the distance the soil is moved.”
Id. The circuit courts have consistently accepted the EPA’s
approach under section 404, holding that the outside world theory
is not controlling on that section. E.g., Greenfield Mill, Inc. v.
Macklin, 361 F.3d 934, 948 (7th Cir. 2004).
The clear intent of Congress in regulating dredged material,
the EPA regulations that include redeposits as discharges, and
the consistent holdings of the courts of appeals demonstrate that
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the outside world interpretation does not apply under section 404.
Thus Bowman’s activities are not exempt from section 404 merely
because he did not introduce foreign pollutants when he
excavated, leveled, and drained his wetlands.
C. Bowman violated the CWA when he failed to get a
permit from the Corps because he redeposited
dredged and fill material into waters of the United
States.
Under the EPA’s regulations, a “redeposit” of dredged
material related to “mechanized landclearing, ditching,
channelization, or other excavation” triggers section 404
permitting requirements. 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2012).
These
operations typically involve “sidecasting,” which “is the deposit of
dredged or excavated material from a wetland back into that
same wetland,” usually by the side of an excavated drainage
ditch. Deaton, 209 F.3d at 335. As the EPA has explained, these
sidecasting “activities have always been regulated under Section
404.” Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. at
45,013. The circuit courts have agreed, holding that “the [CWA’s]
definition of discharge as ‘any addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters’ encompasses sidecasting in a wetland.” E.g.,
Deaton, 209 F.3d at 337.
In United States v. Cundiff, the Sixth Circuit held that
“excavating drainage ditches and clearing trees to make []
wetlands suitable for farming” is subject to section 404. 555 F.3d
at 205. Rejecting an argument that sidecasting is not a discharge
of dredged material, the court held that once wetlands are “dug
up,” the material becomes dredged spoil, and its redeposit is
subject to CWA regulation. Id. at 214–13; see also Deaton, 209
F.3d at 333 (holding that a section 404 permit is required when
excavating a drainage ditch through a wetland and depositing the
material on either side of the ditch).
Bowman’s land-clearing operations are nearly identical to
those discussed in Cundiff and Deaton. He used bulldozers to
convert his 1,000 acre wetland property into land suitable for
agriculture. (R. 3–4). Bowman repeatedly sidecast dredged
material on his wetlands. First, he “used a bulldozer to dig
trenches” in which he pushed trees and other vegetation. (R. 4).
After leveling the property, he dug a drainage ditch that extended
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from the back of his parcel to the Muddy River. (R. 4).
Consistent with Deaton and Cundiff, once Bowman “excavated
[material] from the wetland, its redeposit in that same wetland
added a pollutant where none had been before.” Deaton, 209 F.3d
at 336 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6), (12) (2006)).
The incidental fallback exception is also inapplicable. 40
C.F.R. § 232.2 (“[T]he term discharge of dredged material . . .
include[es] redeposit of dredged material other than incidental
fallback . . . .”). As the D.C. Circuit explained, deliberate
sidecasting is “analytically” distinct from incidental fallback.
Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399,
1406–07 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In United States v. Fabian, a property
owner “used bulldozers, grading and leveling equipment” to
flatten “approximately 7.5 acres of wetlands.” 522 F. Supp. 2d
1078, 1082 (N.D. Ind. 2007). In rejecting an incidental fallback
argument, the court stressed that “[a]bsent a regulatory
definition that is a far cry from the common understanding of the
term, there is simply no way to characterize [these] activities as
incidental fallback.” Id. at 1100. Bowman deliberately sidecast
excavated wetland material on his property; there was nothing
incidental about the discharge and thus the exception is
inapplicable.
Bowman also discharged fill material into wetlands. The
EPA defines discharge of fill material as the “addition of” “any
material [that] has the effect of . . . [c]hanging the bottom
elevation” of water. 40 CFR § 232.2. Similar to dredged material,
the EPA has a “longstanding” history of regulating redeposits of
fill material in wetlands. Water Transfer Proposed Rule, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 32,892. In a factually similar case, the Fifth Circuit held
that the “discharge” of fill material includes “redepositing” trees
and vegetation “taken from . . . wetlands” during land-clearing
activities. Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 923–24. See also Fabian, 522 F.
Supp. 2d at 1093 (holding that a “lateral movement of earthen
materials qualifies as an addition” of fill material).
Here, Bowman used bulldozers to push trees, vegetation, and
soil from “high” portions of the wetland into “low lying portions.”
(R. 4). This activity satisfies the regulatory definition because the
material discharged changed the elevation of the wetland. 40
CFR § 232.2. It is also the type of activity that the circuit courts
and the EPA have long held regulable under section 404. Thus
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Bowman violated the CWA when he bulldozed and leveled 1,000
acres of wetland without a section 404 permit from the Corps.
In conclusion, Bowman’s land-clearing operation is subject to
section 404 because he discharged dredged and fill material on
his wetlands and none of the narrow exceptions allow him to
evade compliance.

CONCLUSION
This Court should hold that NUWF has standing to represent
its members. NUWF has subject matter jurisdiction under
Gwaltney because the presence of dredged and fill material in a
wetland is a continuing violation of the CWA. NUDEP’s prior
action does not preclude NUWF’s citizen suit because it does not
diligently enforce the CWA. Because a redeposit of dredged and
fill material constitutes an “addition” under section 404, Bowman
violated the CWA when he redeposited dredged and fill material
into his wetland without a permit. Therefore this court should
reverse the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment
in favor of Bowman.
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